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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of business cycles driven by shocks to consumer expectations regarding
aggregate productivity. Agents are hit by heterogeneous productivity shocks, they observe their own
productivity and a noisy public signal regarding aggregate productivity. The shock to this public
signal, or "news shock," has the features of an aggregate demand shock: it increases output,
employment and inflation in the short run and has no effects in the long run. The dynamics of the
economy following an aggregate productivity shock are also affected by the presence of imperfect
information: after a productivity shock output adjusts gradually to its higher long-run level, and there
is a temporary negative effect on inflation and employment. A calibrated version of the model is able
to generate realistic amounts of short-run volatility due to demand shocks, in line with existing
time-series evidence. The paper also develops a simple method to solve forward-looking models
with dispersed information.
Guido Lorenzoni
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A common idea, both in the business community and in policy circles, is that changes in
consumer and investor expectations have a causal eﬀect on cyclical ﬂuctuations. In an old-
fashioned keynesian model a shift in consumer expectations would be captured by a “demand
shock,” simply added as an exogenous disturbance to the IS equation. Existing empirical
work in this tradition shows that a sizeable fraction of output volatility can be attributed to
demand shocks, and, in informal discussions, traces these shocks to changes in private sector
expectations.1 However, two questions remain open: is it possible to build a consistent general
equilibrium model that features these types of demand shocks, and, if so, what restrictions
does the theory impose on the economy’s response to them?
In this paper I address these questions by building a model where the fundamental source of
uncertainty are long-run shifts in aggregate productivity, which are not directly observed by the
agents in the economy. Consumers and ﬁrms form expectations based on noisy public sources
of information, summarized by a public signal. The noise component in this signal, or “news
shock,” causes aggregate mistakes in agents’ expectations about productivity. These mistakes
lead to deviations of output from its natural level, which have the typical features of aggre-
gate demand shocks. They have a temporary nature and they generate positive comovement
between output, inﬂation and employment. On the other hand, actual productivity shocks,
in this environment, have the features of aggregate supply shocks. They generate negative
comovement both between output and inﬂation, and between output and employment.
Next, I turn to the restrictions that this theory imposes on equilibrium behavior. If demand
shocks are caused by aggregate mistakes about productivity, then there must be a relation
between the volatility due to actual productivity shocks and the volatility due to temporary
mistakes. As a matter of fact, for each level of volatility in productivity shocks, the theory
places an upper bound on the amount of short-run volatility that demand shocks can generate.
This leads to the question: can the model generate a realistic fraction of demand-driven output
volatility? To address this issue, I calibrate the model, look at its implications for the variance-
decomposition of output at various horizons, and compare it with existing identiﬁed VAR
studies. This exercise shows that the model can produce time series with around 30% of
1See Blanchard and Watson (1987), Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989), Gali (1992).
Note that most studies identify this type of demand shocks separately from monetary shocks and shocks to
government expenditure.
1short-term volatility due to demand shocks. This is in line with existing evidence, based either
on long-run restrictions or on sign restrictions on output and price responses. The crucial
parameter that determines the relevance of demand shocks is the precision of the public signal.
When the public signal is either too precise or too imprecise, demand shocks play only a small
role. In the ﬁrst case, the economy converges immediately to the full information equilibrium,
in the second case, agents tend to disregard public signals. The empirical success of the model
depends on choosing an intermediate level for the signal precision.
The model introduces heterogeneous productivity shocks in an island economy àl aLucas
(1972). Agents observe productivity in their own island and a noisy public signal of the
aggregate level of productivity. The model features households of consumers-producers and
monopolistic competition. Each period, the household sets the price of his own good and
the consumer travels to the other islands to buy the goods produced there. As households
accumulate price and quantity signals they learn the aggregate productivity level, and, absent
further shocks, the economy converges towards its full information equilibrium.
The “supply side” of the model is familiar. As in the classic papers by Phelps (1969) and
Lucas (1972), agents confound aggregate and relative price movements and this explains why
increases in nominal spending have non-neutral eﬀects. The novel element of the model is the
“demand side,” that is, the determination of nominal spending by optimizing consumers in an
environment with imperfect information. Each consumer believes, correctly, that equilibrium
output will gravitate towards the full information equilibrium, determined by average pro-
ductivity. This will determine the spending of other consumers, and, thus, aﬀect his expected
income. However, the latter also depends on the productivity of the sector where the consumer
works. If this sector is relatively less productive than the rest of the economy, the relative price
of its output would be higher and sales will be lower. Due to these two forces, the consumer’s
income expectations end up being an average between his expectation about aggregate pro-
ductivity and his observation of local productivity. Therefore, equilibrium output will be a
weighted average of perceived and realized productivity. The analysis in the paper shows how
the model parameters determine the relative weights of perceived and realized productivity,
and, hence, the eﬀects of news shocks on output.
The main obstacle to studying news shocks in a model with imperfect information is the
analysis of forward-looking consumer behavior. I approach the problem by studying a log-
linear approximation of the optimal consumption policy. This does not eliminate the problem
2of inﬁnite regress that arises in models where agents “forecast the forecasts of others,” identiﬁed
in Townsend (1983). However, it reduces it to a problem of characterizing an inﬁnite sequence
of average ﬁrst moments of agents’ beliefs. Therefore, the paper also develops a tractable
method to study business cycle models with imperfect information.
The paper is related to two recent strands of literature. First, Woodford (2002), Mankiw
and Reis (2002), and Sims (2003), have renewed attention to imperfect information and limited
information processing as causes of sluggish adjustment in prices and other macroeconomic
variables.2 On the other hand, a rich literature, starting with Morris and Shin (2002), has
emphasized that, in environments with strategic complementarities and imperfect information,
public sources of information can cause persistent deviations of economic variables from their
“fundamental” value.3 This paper puts together ideas from these two literatures to build
a theory of demand shocks. On the one hand, imperfect information causes sluggish price
adjustment and allows for demand shocks to have non-neutral eﬀects. On the other hand, the
presence of a public signal on productivity introduces a source of non-fundamental demand
shocks.
An alternative take on the idea of cycles driven by expectational mistakes, is to focus on
mistakes by the monetary authority. This idea ha sb e e nd e v e l o p e di nm o d e l sw i t hs t i c k yp r i c e s ,
assuming that the central bank has imperfect information about the economy’s fundamentals.4
This paper takes a diﬀerent but complementary approach, by focusing on the private sector
mistakes and making stark simplifying assumptions about monetary policy. The integration
of optimal monetary policy in an environment with news-driven demand shocks is pursued in
a companion paper.5
There is a growing empirical and theoretical literature that studies the eﬀect of news on
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, including Cochrane (1994), Danthine, Donaldson, and Johnsen
(1998), Beaudry and Portier (2004 and 2006) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2005). This literature
has focused on news about the future. This is, in part, due to the fact that, in representative
agent models, there is always perfect information about current productivity. The theoretical
work in this area has shown that it is not easy, in a neoclassical environment, to obtain standard
2See also Hellwig (2005), Milani (2005), Nimark (2005), Adam (2006), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006),
Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt (2006).
3See Hellwig (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2004), Amato, Morris and Shin (2005), Bacchetta and Van
Wincoop (2005), Allen, Morris and Shin (2006).
4See Aoki (2003), Orphanides (2003), Reis (2003), Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2005), Tambalotti (2003).
5Lorenzoni (2006).
3comovements in consumption, investment, and hours, following a news shock. The problem,
which was early recognized by Barro and King (1984), is that if the current technological
frontier is unchanged, high expected future TFP will lead to reduced investment and to a
reduction in hours worked.6 This paper takes a diﬀerent course, and explores the idea that the
current aggregate state of the economy is uncertain. The relation between these two approaches
is further discussed in the conclusions.
There is a vast literature that studies cycles due to shifts in expectations in models with
increasing returns and multiple equilibria.7 There are some common elements and some diﬀer-
ences between that literature and the approach in this paper. Both stress the role of comple-
mentarities in consumption decisions. In models with increasing returns this complementarity
is purely technological. In my approach, the complementarity is due to the permanent-income
behavior of consumers: an increase in aggregate spending increases the expected income of all
consumers. This complementarity explains why expected productivity, and not just realized
productivity, determine aggregate consumption.8 On the other hand, the approach based on
multiple equilibria is silent about the sources of expectations-driven ﬂuctuations, relying on
pure shifts in beliefs. The approach followed here, instead, focuses on deriving theory-based re-
strictions on the behavior of demand shocks, exploiting the fact these are related to uncertainty
about long-run changes in productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 I derive the
main qualitative predictions of the model. Section 4 contains the calibration and variance-
decomposition exercise. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The setup is a model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous productivity shocks
a n da ni s l a n ds t r u c t u r eàl aPhelps-Lucas. Individual productivity is given by the sum of
an aggregate productivity shock and an idiosyncratic shock. Agents only observe individual
productivity and a noisy public signal of aggregate productivity.
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by i ∈ [0,1].E a c h
6Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2005) show possible resolutions of this problem,
the ﬁrst based on a model of economies of scope, the second based on adjustment costs in the investment rate,
and preferences that exhibit a weak short-run wealth eﬀect on labor supply.
7See references in Benhabib and Farmer (1999).
8The latter type of complementarity, sometimes called an “aggregate demand externality,” only matters
when price adjustment is sluggish and changes in nominal spending are non-neutral.
4household is located on a diﬀerent island and is made of two agents: a consumer and a producer.
There are two type of commodities. A durable good, H,i nﬁxed supply, and a continuum of
perishable specialized goods, each produced in a diﬀerent island. The durable good produces a
ﬂow of services each period and can be transported across islands. It will be used as commodity
money, and will be called “money” from now on.
Each period t a subset Jit ⊂ [0,1] of specialized goods is selected randomly for each con-
sumer i. The subset Jit represents his consumption basket. The consumer travels to the
islands producing the goods in his basket and exchanges money for the specialized goods pro-
duced there. The random assignment of consumers to islands is necessary to generate noisy
price signals. The details are described in Appendix A.
The essential ingredients of the model are: (i) unobservable aggregate productivity shocks,
(ii) partially revealing prices and quantities, (iii) variable velocity of circulation of money. The
island structure of the model delivers the ﬁrst two features. The latter feature is necessary in
o r d e rt oa l l o wf o rd e m a n ds h o c k sw i t haﬁxed money stock.9 The presence of a single asset,
money, that gives a ﬂow of services is a way of obtaining variable velocity, while keeping the
simplest possible ﬁnancial structure. Note that the model is formally equivalent to a model
with ﬁat money and real balances in the utility function. However, a setting with commodity
money allows for a more natural description of the trading protocol.
















Cit is a composite good deﬁned below, Xit is consumption of services of the durable good, and
Nit are hours worked in the production of good i.
The composite consumption good is a standard CES aggregate including all the varieties













9In the Lucas (1972) model, as in the recent versions of Woodford (2002) and Hellwig (2005), the cash-in-
advance constraint is always binding. Therefore, the only type of shocks to nominal spending that are allowed,
are exogenous shocks to money supply.
5with σ>1,w h e r eCijt is the consumption of good j by consumer i,a n dm is the measure of
Jit, which is constant.
The production function on island i is linear and is given by
Yit = AitNit.
The productivity parameters Ait are diﬀerent across islands and are the fundamental source
of uncertainty in this economy.
There is a ﬁxed stock ¯ H of money in the economy. Each period the household starts with
the initial stock Hit.C o n s u m e r sc a r r yHit to the islands they visit and transfer Hit − Xit to
the local producers. The rest, Xit, produces services which generate the utility ﬂow αlnXit.
The money used in transactions, Hit − Xit,d o e sn o tp r o d u c ea n ys e r v i c ea td a t et.10 Money
is stored one for one from period t to period t +1 .
Uncertainty. Let ait denote the log of Ait.T h ev a r i a b l eait has an aggregate component,
at, and an idiosyncratic one,  it,
ait = at +  it.
The cross sectional distribution of  it satisﬁes
R 1
0  itdi. The aggregate component at follows
the random walk:
at = at−1 + ut.
The aggregate productivity shock ut is the fundamental aggregate shock in this economy. It
would be straightforward to add a deterministic component to productivity growth. To save
on notation, I normalize it to zero.
At the beginning of each period, agents observe a public signal
st = at + et.
The noise component, et, is the “news shock” which will be at the center of the analysis. The
aggregate shocks ut and et are independent, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed






. For each agent i, the idiosyncratic shock,  it,i s
also normal, with zero mean and variance σ2
 , serially uncorrelated, and independent of the
aggregate shock.
10The only role of this assumption is to ensure that the cash-in-advance constraint is never binding, so that
linearization methods can be employed.
6Finally, there is a “sampling shock,” ζit, which determines a bias in the composition of the
consumption basket of consumer i. Namely, average productivity in the islands in Jit is equal
to at + ζit. The sampling shock is i.i.d., normally distributed with variance σ2
ζ.
Trading and information. The only trades allowed in this economy are spot trades of
goods for money. At the beginning of period t, producer i observes ait and st, sets the price
of his good, Pit, and stands ready to deliver any quantity of the good at that price.11 This is
the “pricing stage,” or stage I.
After prices are set, consumer i travels to the islands in Jit and observes the prices of
the goods produced there. Then, he chooses the consumption vector {Cijt}j∈Jit,t r a d e s ,a n d
enjoys the services of the money not used for transactions, Xit,w h e r e




This is the “trading stage,” or stage II. Consumers do not communicate with producers during
the trading stage, so consumers do not know the quantity traded in the home island when they
are making their spending decisions.
At the end of the period, the consumer returns to his island and observes the quantity sold
by the producer, Yit. The stock of money at the end of the period is given by the money in
the hand of the consumer, plus the money accumulated by the producer. Thus, the household
budget constraint at date t is:




The pattern of trade across islands is represented in Figure 1.12
Equilibrium. Consider the vector zt, which summarizes the history of past aggregate
shocks:
zt = hat,s t,a t−1,s t−1,...a 0,s 0i.
Let Z be the set of possible histories zt.L e tμit be a probability measure on Rt−1.I tr e p r e -
s e n t st h eb e l i e f so fc o n s u m e ri on the vector of realized productivity levels hat−1,...a 0i,a tt h e
beginning of period t, before the current shocks are realized. Three objects will be used to
11As usual in models of price setting, I assume that the size of the shocks is small, so that it is always optimal
to produce the quantity demanded.




observe st and ait. 
Set price Pit. 
Consumer spend 
it itC P  
Consumers spend 
PitYit  Island i 
Islands that buy in i at t 
Islands that sell to i at t 
Final balance 
it it it it it C P Y P H − +  
Figure 1: Timeline.
8deﬁne a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium. First, an individual pricing policy rule,
which takes the form Pit = P (Ait,Hit,μ it). Second, a consumption policy rule, which takes













Third, a sequence of cross-sectional distributions for money holdings and beliefs, described by
the CDF G(Hit,μ it;zt) for each zt ∈ Z.
A symmetric rational expectations equilibrium i sg i v e nb yap a i rP and C, and a sequence of
distributions G, that satisfy two conditions: optimality and consistency. Optimality requires
that the policy rules are optimal for the individual household, taking as given the cross sectional
distributions G and the fact that all other households follow P and C. Consistency requires
that, for each state zt+1 that follows zt, the cross sectional distribution G(.;zt+1) is derived
from the distribution G(.;zt) using the individual law of motion for money holdings implied
by P and C, and using rational updating of agents’ beliefs. The details of the equilibrium
construction are in Appendix A.
3 News shocks, output and prices
In this section I analyze the equilibrium determination of output, prices and employment, ﬁrst
in the case of full information and then in the case of imperfect information.
3.1 Full information
First, consider the simplest case, with no heterogeneity. Productivity is equal across islands,
σ2
  =0 , and, in a symmetric equilibrium, prices are identical across islands. In this case the
economy boils down to an economy with a representative consumer and full information about
current productivity. Given the assumption of log preferences and the absence of capital,
employment is constant in equilibrium and output is proportional to aggregate productivity.
All the proofs for this section are in Appendix B.





















The equilibrium price level Pt is inversely related to the productivity level At.S i n c e t h e
supply of money is ﬁxed, when the supply of specialized goods increases their relative price
falls. Given the assumptions made about preferences, Pt adjusts so as to keep a constant
velocity of circulation, PtYt/ ¯ H.13
Consider now the richer case where idiosyncratic uncertainty is present, i.e. σ2
  is positive,
but maintain the assumption of full information about current shocks. Under a log-linear
approximation, the following proposition shows that the aggregate behavior of the economy
is the same as in the representative agent case. From now on, I will use lowercase variables
to denote the logarithm of the corresponding uppercase variable. Also, to simplify notation, I
will omit constant terms when there is no risk of confusion.




The proof of this result provides a useful introduction to the case of imperfect information.
Under full information, output is fully determined by the optimal pricing condition. The ﬁrst
order condition for price setting can be written, in log-linear terms, as:
pit − pit = −ait + cit + η(yit − ait). (2)
For an individual agent, pit − pit reﬂects the relative price of his output in terms of his con-
sumption basket. This equation can be interpreted as follows: the household sets his target
relative price pit−pit proportional to his marginal cost, measured in terms of consumption. His
13T h ep r e s e n c eo fas t o c h a s t i ct r e n di nPt, inversely related to aggregate productivity growth, is a minor
nuisance associated to the assumption of constant money supply. The predictions regarding surprise inﬂation
are robust to diﬀerent scenarios for money growth. Section 4 shows that these predictions survive in a model
with a stationary price level. The case of constant money supply, on the other hand, has clear advantages in
terms of exposition.
10marginal cost depends negatively both on his productivity, ait, and on his expected marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, captured by −(cit + η(yit − ait)).
Aggregating both sides of (2), one obtains:
0=( 1+η)(yt − at) (3)
and the ﬁrst result follows. In the full information equilibrium, when agents set their price, pit,
they perfectly forecast the price of their consumption basket. Moreover, the average relative
price across all agents in the economy must be zero (in log-linear approximation). This, given
the structure of the model, implies that output responds one for one to productivity.14
Summing up, when shocks are fully observed, output is determined by the supply side of the
model and is completely independent of demand dynamics. The demand side only determines
equilibrium prices. The consumer Euler equation can be written as:





where ξ is a positive constant, which depends on β and α.15 The term ξ (hit − pit − cit) on





− pit captures the expected real interest rate, which is equal to the inverse
of expected inﬂation. Note that the relevant rate of inﬂation is individual speciﬁc, given the
diﬀerences in consumption baskets across agents.
Aggregating both sides of (4) gives:
at = Et [at+1] − ξ (pt + at)+Et [pt+1] − pt, (5)
where I use the result that output is equal to productivity and the assumption of constant
money supply. Substituting the candidate equilibrium prices on the right-hand side, the last
three terms cancel out. The equilibrium price path has the property that: (i) the service ﬂow
of money is a constant fraction of nominal spending, (ii) the average expected real rate is
constant.16 Given that output is a random walk, the real rate is equal, up to a constant factor,
to the “natural interest rate” for this economy.
14The same result holds if agents are restricted to observe only the aggregate shock at at the pricing stage,
but not the productivity shocks in the islands they will visit. In this case, agents can still perfectly forecast the
average price and the average consumption, and aggregating across agents still gives (3).







16In fact, this is the only stationary price path consistent with (5).
113.2 Imperfect information
Turning to imperfect information, I now focus on a limit case that illustrates well the central
mechanism of the model. Consider the case where idiosyncratic uncertainty is large with





u approach inﬁnity. At the same time, keep the ratio σ2
e/σ2
u constant, that is,
consider a ﬁxed precision of the public signal st. Then, the relative precision of the private
signals observed by each agent –individual productivity levels and prices– becomes very
small. Therefore, agents put a very small weight on their private information when forecasting
aggregate variables. In the limit, their forecasts of aggregate variables are identical and are
solely based on the public signal st.17
In equilibrium, at the end of each period t, agents learn the aggregate productivity shock
by observing their current sales. This happens because, by observing st and yit, the household
is able to infer exactly the shocks ut and et.18 Due to this result, at−1 is common knowledge
across agents at t, and agents only need to form expectations about the current shock ut.
Denote “public expectations” at time t as EP
t [.] ≡ E [.|st,a t−1]. The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium.




u = ∞ and σ2
e/σ2
u < ∞. Then, equilibrium output and
prices satisfy:
yt = at + λ
¡
EP














t [at] − at
¢
(7)




t [at] for j =0 ,1,... ,
EP
t [pt+j]=−EP
t [at] for j =0 ,1,... .
The constant λ is a function of all the model parameters, α,β,η and σ.19 In the remainder
of this section I will discuss various properties of λ.
17Furthermore, given the high dispersion of price signals, expectations are, in the limit, the same at the
pricing and at the trading stage. Note that private shocks still matter for pricing and consumption decisions at
the individual level, and agents do not have common information regarding individual variables, like ait or pit.
Agents only agree on their expectations about aggregates.









u. See Appendix A, p. 28.
19See the proof of Proposition 3, in Appendix B.
12In this simple case, the responses of output, prices and employment are fully determined
by two variables: realized productivity, at, and the error in the public forecast of aggregate
productivity, at − EP
t [at]. The latter determines both the price surprise pt − EP
t [pt],a n dt h e
output gap yt − at.
3.2.1 Price and output responses








(ut + et). (8)
Substituting (8) in (6) and (7) gives the equilibrium responses of output and prices to the
underlying shocks, ut and et. The next proposition gives a characterization of these responses.
Proposition 4 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, in equilibrium:
(i) a positive news shock, et > 0, increases output and employment, leads to a positive price
surprise and to a negative output surprise;
(ii) a positive productivity shock, ut > 0, increases output, reduces employment, leads to a
negative price surprise and to a positive output surprise.
To gain some intuition for these results, it is useful to go back to the optimality conditions
at the pricing and at the consumption stage. Consider the eﬀects of a positive news shock
et. The public expectation of productivity increases, while actual productivity is unchanged.
Under imperfect information, the Euler equation becomes:
cit = EII







it [.] denotes the expectation of agent i at the trading stage. For the moment, fo-
cus on future expected consumption and leave aside the last three terms on the right-hand
side. Expectations about current productivity aﬀect expected future productivity, which will
determine future income. Moreover, they aﬀect the location of the demand curve faced by
producer at date t, which determines current income and, thus, individual money balances at
the beginning of period t+1. Therefore, high expected productivity tends to increase expected
future consumption.
Consider now the optimal pricing condition in the case of imperfect information:
pit − EI








it [.] denotes the expectation at the pricing stage.20 When expected productivity is
higher than actual productivity, for producer i, he tries to increase the relative price of good
i. There are two reasons for this: high expected output shifts up the demand curve faced by
producer i, and high expected output leads to higher consumption by household i and, thus,
to higher marginal costs in terms of consumption. As all agents are trying to increase their
relative price, they end up increasing the absolute price level above their common target. Their
common mistake results in a positive surprise in the price level. This mechanism is closely
related to the mechanism in Phelps (1969) and Lucas (1972), where agents confound absolute
and relative price changes.
Going back to the demand side, note that a positive price surprise tends to dampen the
response of aggregate consumption through its eﬀects on the expected real rate, as shown by
equation (9).21 This happens because a positive price surprise is associated to an increase
in the real rate perceived by consumers. This follows from three observations: (i) agents’
expectations about the current and the future aggregate price level are the same, (ii) at the
pricing stage, they observe exactly their own price, and, (iii) at the consumption stage, they
observe exactly the price of their consumption basket. The total response of output to a news
shock depends both on the eﬀect on expected income, discussed above, and on the eﬀect on
the expected real rate. Proposition 4 shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates.
This decomposition of the eﬀects of a news shock has a formal counterpart in the expression













The term λ captures the eﬀect of et on expected income, while the term −(λ + η)/(1 + ση)
captures the eﬀect of et on the expected real interest rate. In the next sub-section, I will discuss
the eﬀect of the various model parameters on ψe.
Consider now the eﬀects of a productivity shock ut. This shock increases both actual
productivity, at, and the public expectation about it, EP
t [at]. However, due to imperfect
information, the eﬀect of ut on EP
t [at] is smaller than the eﬀect on at.22 Therefore, EP
t [at]−at
is negative when ut > 0, and gives a negative price surprise. This happens because the
20Both (9) and (10) are derived in the general case, and do not use the assumption of large idiosyncratic
shocks.
21The term ξ (hit − pit − cit) does not add insight to the intuition. In fact, when β → 1 this term is negligible.






14expected upward shift in the demand curve faced by each producer is smaller than the realized
productivity increase, and, thus, producers try to reduce their relative prices. On the quantity
side, consumption increases given that both expected income increases and the expected real
rate decreases. To derive the response of employment I need to determine whether the total
eﬀect on output is larger or smaller than one. Proposition 4 shows that the eﬀect on output is
smaller than one and employment decreases temporarily after a positive productivity shock.23
3.2.2 The eﬀect of news shocks
I turn now to the determinants of ψe,d e ﬁned in (11), which represents the response of output to
news shocks. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of increasing the discount factor β. The next proposition
shows that as β approaches 1, the response of output to news increases and reaches its maximum
value for β =1 .
Proposition 5 The response of output to the news shock is bounded above by:









and limβ→1 ψe = ¯ ψe.
As consumers become more patient, their spending becomes more responsive to productiv-
ity expectations. Consider the average household with  it =0 . After a positive news shock,
expected current income increases less than expected future income. This is because household
i, observing his lower productivity today, increases the price of good i, and expects to sell less
than other households. In the future, household i expects his productivity to catch up with
the average level and the own price eﬀect goes away. As agents become more patient they tend
to respond more to future income, and, thus, they respond more to expected productivity.
Consider now the eﬀect of the parameters σ and η on the response of output to news.
Remember that σ is the elasticity of demand and η is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. It is useful to decompose the eﬀects of these parameters in two parts. First,
keeping λ constant, the parameters σ and η,a ﬀect the response of the price surprise. Second,
the parameters aﬀect the parameter λ.
Consider again the average household, with  it =0 , after a positive news shock. Producer
i thinks his productivity, ait, is lower than expected aggregate productivity, Et [at],a n dt r i e s
23The result that an increase in productivity leads to a temporary reduction in employment in an environment
with imperfect information has been independently derived by Kawamoto (2004).
15to increase his relative price. However, the optimal price response to a perceived productivity
diﬀerential will be smaller if the elasticity of demand, σ, is higher or if the elasticity of labor
supply, 1/η, is lower. At the aggregate level this implies that an aggregate productivity mistake
will have smaller eﬀects on the price surprise. A smaller price surprise also means a smaller
eﬀect on the expected real rate, and thus a bigger response of consumption to the positive
increase in expected income. In conclusion, for a ﬁxed λ,a ni n c r e a s ei nσ and η reduces the
price surprise, and increases the eﬀect on output.
This is related to the notion that η and σ aﬀect the degree of strategic complementarity in
pricing. Through this channel, a higher degree of strategic complementarity in pricing increases
the output response to demand disturbances, as iti sc o m m o ni nt h en e o - k e y n e s i a nl i t e r a t u r e . 24
However, changes in σ and η also aﬀect the parameter λ, which determines the endogenous
response of consumption. Consider the case of σ. Under realistic assumptions about parame-
ters, λ is a decreasing function of σ.25 The intuition for this is the following. Consider again
the average household, after a positive news shock. Producer i is trying to increase his relative
price. A higher elasticity σ implies that his total sales will respond more to the relative price
increase.26 Therefore, the agent expected income responds less to the news shock. This means
that a higher σ induces consumers, in the aggregate, to respond less to news shocks. That is,
this mechanism tends to decrease λ.
Therefore, in general, the relation between the parameters σ and η and the coeﬃcient ψe
is ambiguous. In numerical examples with realistic parameter values, the ﬁrst eﬀect tends to
dominate, and an increase in σ and η tends to increase ψe. This is further illustrated in the
dynamic simulations below.
4 Equilibrium dynamics
In this section I use numerical simulations to analyze the dynamic responses of output, em-
ployment and prices, and to address a basic quantitative question: what fraction of output
volatility can be explained by news shocks? In particular, I look at the ability of the model to
replicate the variance decompositions obtained in existing empirical studies.
In order to perform this quantitative exercise, I modify the model assumptions to obtain a
24See the discussion in Chapter 3 (§1.3) of Woodford (2003).
25In general, depending on parameters, λ can be either decreasing or increasing in σ, the same is true for η.
26In part, this eﬀect is undone by the endogenous change in the optimal price: with higher elasticity the agent
will increase his price less. For realistic parameter values the direct eﬀect dominates.
16more realistic behavior for nominal prices and to allow for interesting learning dynamics. The
details of the model, together with a description of the computational method used, are in
A p p e n d i xC .H e r e ,Iw i l lg i v eab r i e fo v e r v i e wo fb o t h .
On the model side, it is useful to eliminate the mechanical relation between productivity
and the price level, which is due to the assumption of constant money supply. To do that,
I assume that the stock of money in the hands of each household grows over time, and that
the growth rate of the aggregate money stock is the same as that of aggregate productivity. I
also introduce a random component in individual money growth, so that agents cannot infer
aggregate productivity growth from observing it. Furthermore, the model, as it is, has no
learning dynamics and, thus, no propagation mechanism. The observation of output at the
end of date t, yit, together with the observation of st at the beginning of the period, fully
reveals the past shocks ut and et to each household. To introduce learning dynamics in the
model, I assume that each producer is also hit by a local demand shock, nit, which determines
the measure of consumers purchasing good i.T h es h o c knit adds noise to the agents’ signals
and implies that households learn gradually about the underlying aggregate shocks. Once
more, the details can be found in Appendix C.
To compute the equilibrium I need to ﬁnd the coeﬃcients of the relation between aggregate
quantities and prices and the state zt. To solve for optimal individual behavior, I apply
a method of undetermined coeﬃcients, together with a Kalman ﬁlter to solve the agents’
inference problem. The state space is approximated using the truncated state vector z
(T)
t =
{at,s t,...,a t−T,s t−T}.F o rT suﬃciently large the choice of T does not aﬀect the results.27
The parameter β is set equal to 0.99, so the time period can be interpreted as a quarter.
The value of η is set to 0.33, corresponding to a Frisch labor elasticity of 3, and the value
of σ is set to 7.5, which implies a mark-up of around 15%. Both values are in the range of
those used in existing DSGE studies with monopolistic competition and price rigidities. The
parameter α is set equal to 0.01 in the benchmark parametrization. This preference parameter,
together with β =0 .99, implies that the money-to-output ratio in steady state is equal to 2.
Considering that the durable good is the only form of ﬁnancial wealth in the economy, this
does not seem an unreasonable parametrization.28
It remains to choose values for the variance of the shocks. For a variance decomposition
exercise, in a linearized model, the choice of σu is merely a normalization, and I set σu =0 .1.
27Typically 35 periods are suﬃcient for the parameterizations presented.
28Moreover, as β is close to 1, the results presented are not sensitive to the choice of α.
17For the noise in the public signal I choose a benchmark value of σe =0 .62. The precision of
the public signal, 1/σ2
e, is the crucial variable that will determine the importance of demand
shocks. Therefore, in the following, I will consider a range of values for σe a n dl o o ka tt h e i r
implications for short-run output volatility. The main role of the idiosyncratic shocks in the
model is to prevent full information revelation. Therefore, I calibrate their variance in order
to obtain a realistic speed of learning in the economy. I measure the speed of learning in
terms of the number of periods agents take to learn about a permanent productivity shock. In
particular, let at|t ≡
R 1
0 Eit [at]di, denote the average expectation about current productivity.
The average speed of learning is measured by the number of periods it takes for at − at|t
to fall by a factor of 1/2, after a permanent productivity shock ut, i.e., by the half-life of
the average expectational error. I choose a speed of learning of 4 periods (one year).29 The
historical experience with major shifts in productivity growth is that they have typically been
recognized by professional economists and central bankers with a lag of at least two years. On
this basis, this parametrization seems a reasonable starting point.
4.1 Dynamic responses
Figure 2 shows the responses of output, employment and prices to the fundamental shock, ut,
and to the news shock, et.30 The last panel illustrates the dynamics of the average expectational
error regarding aggregate output, yt − yt|t,w h e r eyt|t ≡
R 1
0 Eit [yt]di.
The qualitative responses are analogous to the ones obtained in Proposition 4 for the model
with no learning dynamics. The qualitative behavior of output and inﬂation is consistent with
the evidence from identiﬁed VARs, e.g. Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Gali (1992, Table
III). Namely, following the news shock both output and inﬂation increase, while following
a productivity shock output increases, while inﬂation decreases. Furthermore, the negative
response of employment to the permanent technology shock is consistent with the evidence
presented in Gali (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2003). Recently, there has been substantial
controversy regarding this empirical ﬁnding and more generally regarding the use of VAR
evidence with semi-structural identiﬁcation assumptions.31 This controversy has highlighted
29In the benchmark calibration this corresponds to:
σ  = σζ = σn = σv =5 .
I have experimented with diﬀerent sets of values for these four parameters. For a given speed of learning,
aggregate behavior does not seem to depend on the speciﬁc values chosen for the four parameters.
30For both, I report the response to a one-standard-deviation shock.
31See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Viguﬀson (2003), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004), Gali and Rabanal



























Figure 2: Impulse responses of prices, output, employment and the output surprise.
Solid line: response to productivity shock. Dashed line: response to news shock.
19the need of a theory-based rationale for identiﬁcation assumptions. The present model has the
advantage of being consistent with the identiﬁcation in a large body of empirical work.32
Finally, news shocks are associated to negative output surprises, while fundamental shocks
to positive output surprises. This is an additional testable restriction of the model, which can
potentially be taken to the data, using survey data to estimate yt|t.
4.2 Comparative dynamics
The analysis in Section 3 shows that the model parameters aﬀect the economy response to
the two shocks by determining: (i) the response of spending to expected productivity changes,
(ii) the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing. Here, I show that these observations
extend to the model considered here. Figure 3 illustrates the eﬀect of changing β from 0.99
to 0.95. The top two panels report the benchmark impulse responses, for comparison. As
discussed in sub-section 3.2.2 the parameter β is determinant for the response of consumption
to expected productivity. A reduction in β, by shortening the horizon of the consumers, reduces
the response of spending to expected changes in productivity. As a consequence, news shocks
have a smaller eﬀect, both in terms of prices and in terms of quantities.
Figure 4 shows the responses of prices and output for diﬀerent levels of σ.I nt h et o pt w o
panels I report the results for the benchmark level σ =7 .5 and in the bottom two panels
those for σ =1 5 . A higher level of elasticity of substitution increases the degree of strategic
complementarity in pricing, it reduces the response of prices to both shocks, it increases the
response of output to a news shock and reduces the response of output to a fundamental shock.
4.3 How much short-run volatility can news shocks generate?
The structure of the model imposes a bound on the fraction of output volatility that can be
explained by the news shock. If the public signal is very noisy agents would put little weight
on it, while if the signal is very precise the economy would converge very fast to the full
information equilibrium. In both cases, the news shock would only explain a small fraction
of output volatility. Therefore, the question I address here is whether intermediate levels of
signal precision can generate realistic values for the fraction of output volatility explained by
the demand shocks.
(2004).
32In particular, the model is consistent both with long-run restrictions àl aBlanchard and Quah (1989), and
with sign restrictions, used e.g. in Blanchard (1989) and Canova and De Nicolo (2002).




























Figure 3: Changing the discount factor.
Solid line: response to productivity shock. Dashed line: response to news shock. Shocks as in Figure 3.




























Figure 4: Changing the elasticity of substitution σ.
Solid line: response to productivity shock. Dashed line: response to news shock.
























Figure 5: Signal precision and output responses.
Solid line: response to productivity shock. Dashed line: response to news shock.
Figure 5 illustrates the eﬀects of changing the precision of the signal (i.e. changing σe)o n
the dynamic response of output to the two shocks.33 The ﬁrst panel shows that if the public
signal is very precise, the news shock has very small and temporary eﬀects. Moving to the
second and third panel, the eﬀect of the news shock increases. However, in the fourth panel
the noise becomes so large that the eﬀect on impact of the news shock tends to decrease. On
the other hand, as the quality of the signal deteriorates agents take a longer time to learn the
long-run equilibrium, and the eﬀect of the news shock becomes more persistent.
Table 1 summarizes the model implications in terms of the fraction of output volatility
explained by the news shock at diﬀerent horizons. For comparison, the last column reports
the values obtained by Gali (1992) (Table IV), where the empirical counterpart to the news
shock and the productivity shock are, respectively, the “IS shock” and the “supply shock.”
The ﬁrst column reports the variance decomposition for the benchmark parameters. The
33Note that each panel reports the response to a one-standard-deviation shock.
23model appears able to generate demand-driven short-run volatility in line with empirical ob-
servations, both for output and for prices. The two main results from this table are: (a) it
is possible to choose σe so that the news shock generates 30% of output volatility on impact;
(b) if one chooses σe to generate this amount of short-run volatility, then the news shock ex-
plains 15% of output volatility at a one-year horizon, i.e., around 3/4 of the observed output
volatility due to demand shocks at the same horizon (19%). Result (a) is not obvious given the
non-monotonicity of the relation between σe and short-run volatility discussed above. This is
i l l u s t r a t e di nc o l u m n s( i i )a n d( i i i )w h i c hs h o wt h a t ,i fIm o v ea w a yf r o ma ni n t e r m e d i a t er a n g e
for σe, I obtain lower demand-driven volatility. Result (b) clearly depends on the choice of the
learning speed. This is illustrated in column (iv). In the benchmark calibration I set σ  equal
to 5, in order to obtain a learning-time of 4 quarters. If I reduce σ  to 1, column (iv) shows that
the learning time falls to 3.4 quarters and the eﬀect of the news shock drops considerably.34
Summing up, with a learning time of one year, the pure eﬀect of learning dynamics is able to
generate demand shocks that are both sizeable and persistent.
Notice that, in order to obtain a learning time of 4 quarters, I have to assume a very high
volatility for idiosyncratic shocks, namely shocks 50 times larger than aggregate productivity
shocks. This extreme assumption is needed for two reasons. First, to keep the model tractable, I
have assumed that all shocks are i.i.d., so that every agent collects a large sample of independent
observations in a short amount of time. Allowing for a more realistic autocorrelation structure
f o rt h es h o c k sw o u l ds l o wd o w nl e a r n i n ga n di n troduce an additional source of persistence.
Second, the model structure is very simple, and, in particular, prices are a very good signal of
aggregate expectational mistakes. Introducing monetary shocks uncorrelated to productivity,
or other sources of nominal volatility, would confound the inference problem of the agents. This
would allow me to obtain the same learning speed with more realistic levels of idiosyncratic
volatility. At this stage, large idiosyncratic shocks are a stand-in for all the unmodelled sources
of uncertainty that complicate the learning problem of actual consumers. Further work is
needed to address more explicitly these sources of uncertainty and assess their relevance. One
possible avenue to consider, is to model the idiosyncratic noise as due to costly information
processing, rather than to actual noisy observations, as in the limited attention approach of
Sims (2003).
34Here I am changing the value of σ , keeping the other idiosyncratic variances constant.
24Table 1. Variance decomposition










1 quarter 0.30 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.31
2 quarters 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.17 –
5 quarters 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.19
10 quarters 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.10
Prices
1 quarter 0.53 0.58 0.34 0.52 0.37
2 quarters 0.53 0.58 0.33 0.52 –
5 quarters 0.52 0.58 0.32 0.52 0.52
10 quarters 0.52 0.58 0.30 0.52 0.51
Learning time 4.0 2.1 6.9 3.4
Note: The table reports the fraction of forecast volatility explained by the et shock.
Last column from Table IV in Gali (1992).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have derived the basic implications of a model of demand shocks based on
misperceptions about aggregate productivity. In particular, I have focused on the fraction
of output volatility that is explained by demand shocks. Further restrictions can be derived
and tested. One could be more speciﬁc about the information in the public signal st,a n d
test the model implications in terms of the economy’s response to this signal. For example,
one can focus on the information contained in publicly released macroeconomic statistics.
Rodriguez Mora and Schulstald (2006) present evidence showing that aggregate consumption
responds more to public announcements regarding GNP, than to actual movements in GNP.35
This evidence is clearly consistent with the model presented here. Moreover, recent work
by Beaudry and Portier (2006) shows that the stock market can be used as a measure of
aggregate expectations about future productivity. The model in this paper does not ﬁtw e l lw i t h
the identiﬁcation strategy in their paper, given that it only allows for permanent technology
35The authors look at the eﬀect on aggregate consumption of changes in public statistics regarding GNP,
including both the series representing the initial data release and the series for the revised data, which are
published later but which are more precisely measured. In this way, they can identify a positive eﬀect due to
the noise included in the initial data release.
25shocks.36 Adding to the model news about the future, would make it possible to compare its
implications with their evidence. This extension could also be useful to assess the relation
between the identiﬁcation approach in Beaudry and Portier (2006) and the approach based on
aggregate demand/aggregate supply shocks.37 Finally, one can exploit the fact that consumers’
average expectations will reﬂect the underlying observed signals, and test the theory using
information from consumer surveys data. Recent work by Barsky and Sims (2006) pursues
this approach, using data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers.38
The results of this paper raise a number of questions about what determines the information
collected by consumers, and what determines the overall precision of the information they
acquire. Veldkamp (2006) and Hellwig and Veldkamp (2006) consider models where the decision
to acquire information is treated explicitly. They show that, in environments where there
are gains from coordination, agents tend to acquire similar pieces of information, and thus
the potential for coordinated mistakes is bigger. Therefore, the role for demand shocks may
actually be magniﬁed when the information structure is endogenous. On the other hand,
Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt (2006), focus on endogenous information processing, in a price
setting with limited attention. They show that the level of aggregate volatility aﬀects the
amount of attention agents devote to the shocks in their local markets and to aggregate shocks.
Here I have assumed that agents observe their local shock with perfect precision, while they
observe the aggregate shock with noise. The results in Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt (2006) oﬀer
a microfoundation for this assumption. At the same time, they show that this assumption may
be sensitive to changes in macroeconomic uncertainty.
36Beaudry and Portier (2006) focus on shocks to expectations about future TFP, which are orthogonal to
current TFP shocks. Clearly, such shocks are not present if productivity is a random-walk.
37Conceptually, the two approaches simply diﬀer in terms of the orthogonal decomposition of the shocks
they adopt. Here I focus on the decomposition (ut,e t), which leads to a standard keynesian identiﬁcation. An
alternative decomposition is
³






, which separates the “information shock” ut +et,c a p t u r e db y
the innovation in st. This second decomposition is closer to the identiﬁcation in Beaudry and Portier (2006).
38Namely, they try to identify both an information shock –corresponding to ut + et in the current model–,
and an animal spirit shock – corresponding to the news shock et in the current model. When unemployment
is not included in the VAR, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation with consumer conﬁdence measures for the ﬁrst type
of shock, but not for the latter. When unemployment is included, instead, their evidence is also consistent with
as i g n i ﬁcant relation between the news shock and consumer conﬁdence.
26Appendix
A. Deﬁnitions and linearization
This appendix contains the details of the model which are not in the main text, a formal deﬁnition of
rational expectations equilibrium, and a deﬁnition of the notion of log-linear equilibrium that is used
as an approximation.
Consumption baskets











. The sampling shocks
satisﬁes
R 1





  = σ2
ζ + σ2
 |ζ.
This ensures that the cross sectional distribution of productivity shocks observed by consumers is
identical to the distribution across producers.
Equilibrium
Price and demand indexes. To deﬁne a rational expectations equilibrium it is useful to deﬁne two
functions, which give the price and demand indexes associated to the triple hP,C,{G}i.
The price index function P (ζit,z t) gives the price index for a consumer with sampling shock ζit.
This price index is derived substituting the individual pricing rule P (eait,H it,μ it) in expression (1) and





for the productivity shocks ait.
The demand index function D(zt) gives the constant in the demand curve faced by the producer.






Aggregating across consumers gives Yit = P
−σ






Substitute Cit and Pit on the right-hand side, using the individual consumption rule
C
¡
eait,H it,P (ζit;zt),μ it
¢
and the price index function derived above. Integrate using the distribution











the productivity shock ait. This gives the function D(zt).
Optimality and consistency. The household problem is to set prices and consumption to maximize





Xit = Hit − PitCit,
Hit+1 = Hit − PitCit + PitYit,
Pit = P (ζit,z t),
27and to the measurability constraints reﬂecting the information available to consumers at each stage.
Optimality requires that P and C are a solution to this optimization problem.
The beliefs of household i at the pricing stage, μI
it, are given by the bayesian update of μit based
on the observation of Ait. The beliefs at the trading stage, μII
it ,a r et h eu p d a t eo fμI
it based on
Pit = P (ζit,z t). The end-of-period beliefs μit+1 of household i at the end of the period are the update
of μII
it based on the observation of Dt = D(zt).
Incidentally, the fact that Dt is a function of zt can be used to show that, in equilibrium, quantity
observations fully reveal the aggregate productivity shock. In Section 4, instead, I introduce local
demand shocks nit, and the demand for producer i will be enitD(zt). This assumption prevents full
revelation in equilibrium.
The consumption and pricing rule, together with the bayesian updating rules described above deﬁne
an individual law of motion that, for each pair Hit and μit, and each realization of the shocks ut,e t,  it





derived from G(Hit,μ it;zt) using this law of motion and the exogenous distributions of  it and ζit.
Log-Linearization
In order to study the equilibrium I resort to log-linearization. The choice of a linear approximation is
dictated by the presence of imperfect information. In the original non-linear form the inference problem
of the agents is daunting. In linear form, the Kalman ﬁlter can be used and recursive methods can be
applied to characterize the equilibrium.
In a linear equilibrium aggregate output and prices, yt and pt,a r e :
pt = φzt, (13)
yt = ψzt, (14)
where φ and ψ are two vectors of coeﬃcients. The solution of the model requires solving a ﬁxed point
problem to ﬁnd the coeﬃcients φ and ψ that are consistent with optimality, belief rationality and
consistency.
To use linearization methods in presence of imperfect information, requires an extra assumption.
Namely, I assume that the agents in the model also use a linear model when drawing inferences from
prices and quantity observations. In particular they use the model:
pit = φzt + φζζit,
yit + σpit =( ψ + σφ)zt + nit,
where pit is the log of the price index for agent i,a n dyit + σpit is the log of the demand index for
agent i,a n dφζ is a coeﬃcient to be determined in equilibrium. Here, to be general, I allow for local
demand shocks, nit, as in the model of Section 4 (see Appendix C). Note that, apart from using a linear
approximation, consumers use the correct model of the economy, i.e. they use values of φ and ψ and
φζ that are consistent with equilibrium behavior.
When agents use a linear model, their beliefs about the state zt are normally distributed and
their dynamics can be characterized using the Kalman ﬁlter. Then, the state vector for the agent
decision problem is reduced to: the money balances and the ﬁrst moment of his beliefs about zt.T h i s
simpliﬁcation of the state vector allows me to linearize the individual pricing and consumption rules
P and C. This rules can then be aggregated and the equilibrium is found as the solution of a ﬁxed
point problem. Linearity helps in three dimensions: it simpliﬁes the inference problem faced by each
individual, it simpliﬁes the state space for individual decision rules, and it allows for aggregation of
individual decision rules.
In the baseline model, studies in Section 3 agents learn the state zt at the end of period t.T h i s
allows me to derive the equilibrium in closed form, these derivations are in Appendix B. In the extended
model of Section 4, instead, I have to keep track of the agents expectations regarding all past shocks.
28In Appendix C I describe how to compute the linear individual decision rule in this case, and I derive
the steady-state cross sectional distributions of hit and Eit [zt].
Finally, a brief remark on an issue that arises when taking linear approximations in a non-stationary
model with imperfect information. The random walk for at makes the model non-stationary. Therefore,
when taking a log-linear approximation I need to normalize variables by At,e . g .s e tˆ cit =l n( Cit/At).
However, with imperfect information agents do not observe At, This means that, for example, in the
consumer ﬁrst order conditions I will have Eit [ˆ cit] and Eit [ˆ cit] 6=ˆ cit. In order to recover agents’ decision
rules it is convenient to add and subtract at whenever an expression like Eit [ˆ cit] appears, e.g.
Eit [ˆ cit]=cit − Eit [at]+Eit [at].
In this way, I derive the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and prices, (9) and (10).
B. Proofs for Section 3
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1


























Substituting the conjectured equilibrium prices and quantities it is immediate to check that household
behavior is optimal.
Remark
A preliminary remark on the limit results in sub-section 3.2: analytical results can also be derived for
t h ec a s eo fﬁnite values of idiosyncratic variances. Moreover, it is possible to show, by continuity, that
the behavior of the economy in the case of inﬁnite idiosyncratic variances is indeed the limit of the ﬁnite
variances case. The details are available from the author.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Begin with the following guess for aggregate prices and output:
pt = −at−1 + φuut + φeet,
yt = at−1 + ψuut + ψeet,







Using this guess, the expected demand curve faced by producer i is:
Eit [yit]=EP
t [at] − σpit.











Eit [yt + σpt].
29For the individual policy rule for consumption use the conjecture
cit + pit = bhhit + ba (ait − Eit [at]). (15)
The Euler equation (9), in the text, can be rewritten as








α+(1−β)2 ∈ (0,1), while the agent budget constraint is, in log-linear terms:




Using the individual policy (15) the Euler equation becomes:
pit + cit =( 1− δ)hit + δbhEit [hit+1],
and, using the initial guesses, the budget constraint gives:










Eit [yt + σpt].















(1 + η)(σ − 1)
1+ησ
bh. (18)




σ (1 + η)
1+ησ
b2
h =1− bh. (19)
This equation has a unique positive solution in (0,1). The second equation is a linear equation that
gives ba.



































λ ≡ 1 − ba,
this gives (7). Substituting in (20) gives (6).
To prove that λ ∈ (0,1) notice that, given that bh > 0 one obtains
δθbh





which implies ba ∈ (0,1). Therefore, as long as bh and ba satisfy (17) and (18) the initial guesses are
veriﬁed and consumer behavior is optimal.
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
The coeﬃcient ψe was derived in the text, see (11). This coeﬃcient is positive as long as:
λσ > 1. (21)




(1 − δ)(1− bh)
1 − δ (1 − bh)
.
Substitute this expression in (21). After some algebra one obtains that (21) is satisﬁed if and only if
(σ − 1)bh > 0 which is satisﬁed as long as bh > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Consider equation (19), which determines bh. It is straightforward to show that limδ→1 bh =0which,





which proves the statement.
C. Assumptions and computational method for Section 4
Additional assumptions










Let Rit = R0 exp(ut + vit),w h e r eut is the aggregate productivity shock, and vit is an i.i.d. shock





. As usual, assume that the idiosyncratic
shocks satisfy
R 1
0 vit =0 .
Furthermore, assume that producer i is visited by a subset of measure of consumers equal to
exp(nit).T h ev a r i a b l enit is i.i.d., normal with variance σ2
n,a n ds a t i s ﬁes
R 1
0 enitdi =1 .
The equilibrium deﬁnition in Appendix A is easily adapted to this case. Note that the results in
Section 3 can be extended to the case of money growth, if one maintains σ2
n =0and the assumption
of large idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, one can show that, as β → 1, the behavior of output is the
same in the two cases. Analytical results for this case are available from the author.
Computation
Consider the linear equilibrium:
pt = φzt,
yt = ψzt.
Given a vector of parameters (φ,ψ) I derive optimal decision rules. Using bayesian updating, I also ﬁnd
the agents’ ﬁrst-order expectations regarding zt. The optimal decision rules can then be aggregated to





. I iterate this procedure until I ﬁnd a ﬁxed point.
31Optimal decision rules. Write the individual decision rules in the following form:
pit = qhhit + qaait + qI
zEI
it [zt], (22)





Let me write here the ﬁrst order conditions, the budget constraint, and the demand for good i:
pit − EI




it [yit] − ait
¢
,






hit+1 = hit + θ(pit + yit − pit − cit)+rit+1,
yit = yt + σ (pt − pit)+nit.













bhhit +( ba − 1 − η)ait},













it [hit+1]=hit + θ
¡
pit + EII




it [yit]=( ψ + σφ)EII
it [zt] − σpit,
where e1 is the vector [1,0,0...].















































For a given pair ψ and φthese equations can be solved for q and b. Notice that the parameters
qh,q a,b h,b a,b p can be determined separately, without knowledge of ψ and φ.
32Bayesian updating. The learning problem of the individual agent can be solved recursively using
the Kalman ﬁlter. It is convenient to divide the ﬁltering problem in three stages. The ﬁrst two stages
correspond to the pricing and trading stages I and II. The last stage correspond to the time when
consumers return to their island of origin and observe the quantity sold at the end of period t.D e n o t e
end of period expectations as Eit [.].
The law of motion for the exogenous state zt is:






For computational purposes we will consider the truncated version of zt, z
[T]
t = {at,s t,...at−T,s t−T}.
















Given φ and ψ I can derive the expressions for the Kalman ﬁlter for agent i.A g e n ti ﬁrst observes the





then observes pit, and, ﬁnally, observes the quantity signal yit + σpit.
The relation between the signals (Sit,pit,y it + σpit) and the aggregate state zt is given by:
Sit = Gzt + F ( it,v it)
0 ,
pit = φzt + φζζit,



























Q = φ, R = ψ + σφ.
The agents expectations are given by
EI
















To derive the Kalman gains C,L,and M use the following deﬁnitions:
Ω = Va r it−1 [zt], ΩI = Va r I
it [zt], ΩII = Va r II
it [zt].
Then the Kalman gains are:
















33The matrices Ω need to satisfy the equations:
ΩI = Ω − ΩG0 (GΩG0 + FΣV F0)
−1 GΩ, (26a)












Using the law of motion of zt we obtain the steady state condition:










T os o l v ef o rt h em a t r i c e sΩ I use iterations on the (26). Then the Kalman gains C,L and M are derived
from (25).
Fixed point. The average ﬁrst order expectations can be expressed in terms of the current state as
zt|tI = ΞIzt,z t|tII = ΞIIzt,z t|t = Ξzt.
Using the updating equations and aggregating across consumers gives:
zt|t =( I − MR)(I − LQ)(I − CG)Azt−1|t−1 +
((I − MR)((I − LQ)CG+ LQ)+MR)zt,
which gives the following expression for Ξ,
Ξ =( I − MR)(I − LQ)(I − CG)AΞ +
((I − MR)((I − LQ)CG+ LQ)+MR),
and similar expressions for ΞI and ΞII. These matrices are inﬁnite dimensional. When using the
truncated vector z
[T]
t one ﬁnds ﬁnite dimensional matrices Ξ[T] that approximate Ξ (more on this




Having expressions for zt|tI and zt|tII in terms of the current state variable I can use the equilibrium
relations to obtain:
φ
0 =( qh + qa)e1 + qzΞI,
ψ
0 =( bh + ba)e1 + bpφ + bI
zΞI + bII
z ΞII.
Moreover, consistency of the pricing rules with the price indexes requires φζ = ba.
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the approximation due to the truncation of the state space, I

























II ,f o rag i v e nk.
Cross-sectional dispersion. It is also possible to derive the equilibrium joint distribution of
money holdings and beliefs. Deﬁne the idiosyncratic component of agents’ expectations as
Jit = Eit [zt] − zt|t,
34and deﬁne JI
it and JII
it in a similar way. Use the relations (24) to obtain the following recursive expression
for the individual forecast errors:
JI
it =( I − CG)AJit−1 + CFVit,
JII
it =( I − LQ)JI
it + Lζit,
Jit =( I − MR)JII
it + Mnit.
This gives the law of motion for the individual forecast errors:
Jit =( I − MR)(I − LQ)(I − CG)AJit−1 +
+(I − MR)(I − LQ)CFVit +( I − MR)Lζit + Mnit.





(1 − σ)qz − bI
z
¢
(I − CG)A + bII
z (I − LQ)(I − CG)A
¤
Jit−1 +
+[1+θ(1 − σ)qx − θbx]xit−1 + θbII









z (I − LQ)CF
¤
Vit +
+θ((1 − σ)qa − ba) it +[ 1+θ((1 − σ)qx − bx)]vit.
Using the relations just derived one can write the joint dynamics of individual wealth and expectations
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